Muhammadiyah’s Moderation Stance in the 2019 General Election: Critical Views from Within by Nashir, Haedar et al.
Al-Jāmi‘ah: Journal of  Islamic Studies - ISSN: 0126-012X (p); 2356-0912 (e)
Vol. 57, no. 1 (2019), pp.1-24, doi: 10.14421/ajis.2019.571.1-24
MUHAMMADIYAH’S MODERATION STANCE 
IN THE 2019 GENERAL ELECTION
Critical Views from Within
Haedar Nashir; Zuly Qodir; Achmad Nurmandi; Hasse Jubba; 
Mega Hidayati 
Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Indonesia
email: haedarnashir@umy.ac.id
Abstract
This study focuses on the way in which Muhammadiyah, one of  Indonesia’s 
largest Islamic organizations, stood in the 2019 General Election. Like its 
counterpart Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah has marked the moderation 
of  Islam in Indonesia, different from Islam elsewhere in the Middle East. 
Since its establishment, Muhammadiyah has urged its members not to join 
any specific political party, but rather to take a moderate position in political 
pragmatism and support patriotism in broader national interest. Likewise, 
in the 2019 election, Muhammadiyah did not organizationally support any 
candidates, citing its “middle way” approach. However, this study identifies 
a dualism in the political attitudes of  Muhammadiyah’s elites. Even without 
official orders or prohibitions from the central leadership, some Muhammadiyah 
members got involved and carried their organization’s attributes to support 
certain candidates, resulting in political division within the organization. 
Some members of  the organization took a clear political stance, whereas 
others remain neutral. This created tension within the organization in both 
elite and grass-root level. The main data for this study were collected through 
interviews, unstructured discussions, and focus group discussions with several 
Muhammadiyah elites.
[Artikel ini melihat posisi yang diambil salah satu organisasi Islam terbesar 
di Indonesia, Muhammadiyah, dalam Pemilu 2019. Bersamaan dengan 
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Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah menjadi penanda moderasi Islam 
di Indonesia yang berbeda dengan Islam di tempat lain. Sejak didirikan, 
Muhammadiyah telah menandaskan untuk tidak berafiliasi dengan partai 
politik tertentu, tetapi mengambil posisi moderat dalam perpolitikan 
dan mendukung patriotisme demi kepentingan nasional yang lebih luas. 
Demikian juga, dalam Pemilu 2019, Muhammadiyah secara resmi tidak 
mendukung calon mana pun berdasarkan konsep “jalan tengah”. Namun, 
penelitian ini mengidentifikasi adanya dualisme dalam sikap politik para elit 
Muhammadiyah. Tidak adanya perintah atau larangan resmi dari pusat, 
banyak anggota Muhammadiyah yang membawa atribut organisasi dan 
terlibat aktivitas politik serta mendukung kandidat tertentu. Ini berakibat 
munculnya keterbelahan politik dalam Muhammadiyah. Beberapa anggota 
mengambil sikap politik yang jelas, sedangkan yang lain tetap netral. Ini 
menimbulkan ketegangan dalam organisasi, baik di tingkat elit maupun akar 
rumput. Data utama untuk penelitian ini dikumpulkan melalui wawancara, 
diskusi tidak terstruktur, dan diskusi kelompok terfokus dengan beberapa 
elit Muhammadiyah.]
Keywords:  Indonesian general election, Muhammadiyah, Islamic politics, 
Islamic movement
A. Introduction
Muhammadiyah, as Indonesia’s second-largest Islamic organization 
after Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), has become a major force in Indonesian 
society.1 These two organizations have worked to develop a moderate 
understanding of  Islam in the country.2 Established on November 18, 
1912, Muhammadiyah has survived because of  its solidarity, extensive 
networks, and activities in the fields of  education, health, and poverty 
alleviation.3 Nonetheless, its political involvement is reflected more in 
1 Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
2 Alpha Amirrahman, Andar Nubowo, and Azaki Khoirudin (eds.), Islam 
Berkemajuan untuk Peradaban Dunia: Refleksi dan Agenda Muhammadiyah ke Depan (Bandung: 
Mizan, 2015), p. 23.
3 Mitsuo Nakamura, The Crescent Arises over the Banyan Tree: A Study of  the 
Muhammadiyah Movement in a Central Javanese Town, c.1910s-2010, 2nd edition (Singapore: 
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national politics than in political parties.4 
Alfian mentions that Muhammadiyah is a non-political movement 
and as such it must be distinguished from organizations that make politics 
their profession. It tries not to involve itself  in politics directly and 
openly. Previously, Muhammadiyah had been involved in such political 
movements as Syarikat Islam and Parmusi, with its political role being 
determined by a sort of  situational logic.5 In the 1955 General Election, 
Muhammadiyah was part of  the Masjumi Party.6 
Muhammadiyah has long been assumed to follow a “middle way” 
in its political activities, not prohibiting members from being active in 
political parties but also not encouraging such membership. This reflects 
Muhammadiyah’s moderate view towards its members. Muhammadiyah 
remains political, but is not about which not a political party the members 
should join and, in other words, it does not support a particular political 
party.7 It instead concentrates its activities on national politics for the 
sake of  a broader national interest in keeping the unity and harmony 
of  the nation.8 Nonetheless, there has been a ‘tug of  war’ between 
Muhammadiyah members who desire political participation and those 
who do not.
B. Muhammadiyah’s Political Involvement
Although Muhammadiyah has not always been politically active, 
its contributions to Indonesian Islamic thought and movement have 
ISEAS Publising, 2012), p. 175; Robin Bush, A Snapshot of  Muhammadiyah Social Change 
and Shifting Markers of  Identity and Values, Working Paper, no. 221 (Singapore: Asia 
Research Institute, NUS, 2014), p. 3.
4 Saleh Partaonan Daulay and Abd. Rohim Ghazali (eds.), Muhammadiyah dan 
Politik Islam Inklusif: 70 tahun Ahmad Syafii Maarif (Jakarta: Maarif  Institute for Culture 
and Humanity, 2005), p. 35.
5 Alfian, Muhammadiyah: The political behavior of  a Muslim modernist organization under 
Dutch colonialism (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1989), p. 169.
6 Syaifullah, Gerak Politik Muhammadiyah dalam Masyumi (Jakarta: Grafiti, 1997). 
7 Zuly Qodir, Achmad Nurmandi, and M. Nurul Yamin (eds.), Ijtihad Politik 
Muhammadiyah: Politik sebagai Amal Usaha (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar & Jusuf  Kalla 
School of  Government, 2015), pp. 133–43.
8 Suaidi Asyari, ‘Gerakan Pembaruan Pemikiran Islam di Indonesia’, Miqot: 
Jurnal Ilmu-ilmu Keislaman, vol. 35, no. 2 (2011), pp. 295–313.
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been significant.9 The organization’s involvement in shaping the state is 
also apparent.10 Muhammadiyah members, who are spread throughout 
Indonesia—even in rural areas of  Java—seem to concentrate more on 
developing moderate and progressive Islamic da’wah activities.11
Muhammadiyah claims to have 25 million members, 10,000 schools 
and kindergartens, 174 universities, and 5000 hospitals. As such, since its 
establishment in 1912, Muhammadiyah has shown significant concern 
for education, health, and human development.12 
Muhammadiyah’s considerable size has attracted many politicians 
and political parties. However, given the organization’s focus on non-
political activities, members who become active in practical politics do 
not officially use Muhammadiyah attributes; this was seen, for example, in 
the 2019 General Election. Although, Muhammadiyah members are seen 
as using a particular party—the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat 
Nasional)—to channel Muhammadiyah’s organizational aspirations, 
the organization has still clearly distinguished between members’ roles 
as members and their political activities by not expressly supporting a 
presidential candidate in the 2019 General Election. 
Between 2016 and 2018, Indonesian national politics were shaken 
by three large demonstrations protesting purportedly blasphemous 
statements made by Jakarta’s incumbent governor Basuki Tjahaya 
Purnama (Ahok) in the lead-up to the Jakarta Gubernatorial Election. The 
first action, held at City Hall in October 2016, did not draw widespread 
public attention. However, the second and third actions—labelled ‘Aksi 
Bela Islam’ (Actions to Defend Islam), but popularly known as the 411 
9 M. Syafi’i Anwar, Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam Indonesia: Sebuah kajian politik tentang 
cendekiawan Muslim Orde Baru (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1995), pp. 119–25; Bahtiar Effendy, 
Islam dan Negara: Transformasi Gagasan dan Praktik Politik Islam di Indonesia (Jakarta: 
Paramadina, 1998), pp. 79–84.
10 Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan: Studi tentang Pecaturan 
dalam Konstituante (Jakarta: Lembaga Penelitian Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi 
dan Sosial, 1985), pp. 179–95.
11 Ahmad Najib Burhani, Muhammadiyah Berkemajuan: Pergeseran dari Puritanisme ke 
Kosmopolitanisme (Bandung: Mizan, 2016), pp. 35–7; Hyung-Jun Kim, Reformist Muslims in 
Yogyakarta Village: The Islamic Transformation of  Contemporary Socio-religious Life (Canberra: 
ANU E Press, 2007), pp. 123–4.
12 Bush, A Snapshot of  Muhammadiyah, p. 3.
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Action and 212 Action—caught the attention of  the Indonesian public 
and even foreign observers. Many people identified these protests, 
attended by 5–7 million people dressed in white, as “people power 
movements” and populist Islamic movement. Such undercurrents 
of  Islamic populism were revealed by Vedi R. Hadiz in his study of  
demonstrations in the Middle East and Indonesia.13
These protests—among the numerous conflicts between moderate 
and intolerant Muslims that have occurred since the fall of  President 
Soeharto in 199814—gained widespread attention due to several factors, 
including political, economic, legal, citizenship, and cultural ones. Muslims 
from various regions and organizations attended these protests, urging 
the government to take firm action against the alleged blasphemy. Some 
participants stated that President Joko Widodo was a weak leader unable 
to enforce the law and guarantee the public welfare. Similar claims were 
made by the orators, most of  whom were antagonistic against the ruling 
government. This perceived weakness led to reduced public satisfaction 
with Joko Widodo’s government. According to one survey by the 
Indonesian Survey Institute, 46,4% of  respondents were not satisfied 
with the Joko Widodo-Jusuf  Kalla government.15 
In the lead-up to the 2019 General Election, national and local 
political conditions remained tense. Sensitive issues, such as religion 
and communism, became commodities for demonstrations, and hate 
speech was common on the internet. Supporters of  the two presidential 
candidates, Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto, were highly polarized.16 
13 Vedi R. Hadiz, Islamic Populism in Indonesia and the Middle East (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015).
14 Noorhaidi Hasan, “Religious Diversity and Blasphemy Law: Understanding 
Growing Religious Conflict and Intolerance in Post-Suharto Indonesia”, Al-Jami’ah: 
Journal of  Islamic Studies, vol. 55, no. 1 (2017), pp. 105–26.
15 Abraham Utama, “Poltracking: Sistem Komunikasi Publik Jokowi 
Harus Dibenahi”, CNNIndonesia-Nasional, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/
nasional/20150419175143-32-47730/poltracking-sistem-komunikasi-publik-jokowi-
harus-dibenahi, accessed 17 May 2019.
16 Alexander R. Arifianto, “Is Islam an increasingly polarizing political cleavage 
in Indonesia?”, Brookings (25 Apr 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-
chaos/2019/04/25/is-islam-an-increasingly-polarizing-political-cleavage-in-indonesia/, 
accessed 19 May 2019.
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In this highly charged atmosphere, Indonesian Muslims were 
similarly polarized. Muslims, including members of  Muhammadiyah, 
got involved in practical political movements, supporting presidential 
candidates and their policies.17 Muslims were pushed apart, and 
mainstream Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah and NU 
were stuck in the middle,18 caught between political involvement and 
neutrality. The democracy in Indonesia, where Muslims are a majority, 
was becoming less tolerant.19
Muhammadiyah chose neutrality. However, it still faced significant 
challenges. Members were polarized by their political ideologies and 
different understandings of  Islam. At the central and regional level, 
Muhammadiyah members were interested in new Islamic broadcasters 
(including short online videos) and leaders (such as those in new 
Islamic mass organizations). The Deputy of  the Tarjih Council at the 
Muhammadiyah Central Leadership, MA Fatah Santoso discussed this 
issue:
Muhammadiyah is currently facing a serious challenge to its da’wah, to its 
spreading Islam rahmatan lil alamin and Islam wasathiyah (moderate Islam). 
This has happened because a number of  Islamic broadcasters are spreading 
understandings of  Islam that are not the same as Muhammadiyah’s, but 
have attracted Muhammadiyah members from the central to the regional 
level. If  not handled properly, in the future many members and leaders 
of  Muhammadiyah will have non-Muhammadiyah ideologies.20
That has helped influence Muhammadiyah’s political attitude. 
Even though the Muhammadiyah Central Leadership did not campaign 
for candidates, in reality members still supported them. Some leaders 
even openly became part of  candidates’ campaign teams. “The different 
political attitudes of  Muhammadiyah’s leaders and members come from 
17 Alexander R. Arifianto, “Practicing What It Preaches? Understanding the 
Contradictions between Pluralist Theology and Religious Intolerance within Indonesia’s 
Nahdlatul Ulama”, Al-Jami’ah: Journal of  Islamic Studies, vol. 55, no. 2 (2017), pp. 241–64.
18 Achmad Zainal Arifin, “Defending Traditions, Countering Intolerant 
Ideologies: Re-energizing the Role of  Modin in Modern Java”, Al-Jami’ah: Journal of  
Islamic Studies, vol. 55, no. 2 (2017), pp. 265–92.
19 Jeremy Menchik, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia: Tolerance without liberalism 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 120–2.
20 MA. Fatah Santoso, FGD interview (16 Feb 2019). 
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a non-Muhammadiyah Islamic understanding, which tends to be a Salafi 
jihadist or political mode of  Ihkwanul Muslimin or tarbawi.”21 
C. Muhammadiyah’s Political Attitude
Muhammadiyah, as a major Islamic organization in Muslim-
majority Indonesia,22 asserts that Islam in Indonesia does not require 
numerous imams. Rather, Indonesian Islam requires Muslim leaders who 
can demonstrate political views and be good political representatives 
of  Muslims. In present-day Indonesia, political parties with Islamic 
ideologies such as the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, 
PKS) and the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, 
PPP) have committed criminal acts of  corruption and other improper 
acts, and as such have been argued to not represent Muslims accurately.
The Central Chairman of  Muhammadiyah, Dadang Kahmad, 
firmly stated that:
Our respectable imam as an organization is the Chairman of  
Muhammadiyah Central. We do not know the term ‘High Priest of  
Islam’ in Indonesia. We view all scholars as respected leaders. However, 
there are no ‘high priests’ or ‘low priests’. All of  them contribute to the 
progress of  the nation and Indonesia’s Muslims. We do not need various 
titles to help Muslims who are suffering from various national problems. 
Muhammadiyah is more interested in developing the nation’s society and 
social welfare, rather than religious titles.23
When involved in practical politics, religious leaders (Islamic 
organizations) cannot call themselves “Muhammadiyah” or “NU”. 
There’s is a self-representation, wherein individuals join political and 
party activities of  their own will. Moreover, Muhammadiyah did not 
support any candidates in the 2019 General Election. Muhammadiyah’s 
General Secretary stated that:
Muhammadiyah gives its members rights in both local and general 
21 Syafiq Mugni, interview (18 Mar 2019).
22 Saiful Mujani, Muslim Demokrat: Islam, budaya demokrasi, dan partisipasi politik di 
Indonesia pasca Orde Baru (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama-Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan 
Masyarakat- Yayasan Wakaf  Paramadina- Freedom Institute-Kedutaan Besar Denmark, 
2007), pp. 233–5.
23 Dadang Kahmad, interview (18 Mar 2019).
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elections. There is no prohibition, or order to choose a specific candidate. 
Muhammadiyah members are smart and politically mature. There is no 
need for direction or political mobilization.24
Even though Muhammadiyah lets followers choose their own 
candidates, this does not mean the organization ignores the nation’s 
problems. Muhammadiyah questions the neutrality of  the Indonesian 
National Armed Forces and the Indonesian National Police, which seem 
to have stemmed peaceful protests such as istighosah. The Chief  of  
Police even recommended that citizens avoid political activities before the 
election or hold istighosah in their respective regions.25 It also maintained 
excellent collaboration with the Joko Widodo – Jusuf  Kalla government; 
the General Secretary identified Widodo as having visited the most often.26
Muhammadiyah, as a modern socio-religious organization, issued a 
circular before the election that urged members to focus on bigger issues 
rather than peaceful protests. However, this circular received suboptimal 
responses from leaders at the provincial, regency, and district levels. 
Many Muhammadiyah followers and leaders—mostly from West Java, 
Yogyakarta, Central Java, and Bali—joined the protests in Jakarta. Some 
considered these actions as defending Islam and as a form of  jihad, rather 
than a protest of  Widodo’s regime. 
Muhammadiyah’s General Secretary, Abdul Mu’thi, stated that the 
organization would not become involved in practical politics, support 
candidates, or do similar actions. It would focus on national politics. Any 
political activities could not be done in the name of  Muhammadiyah. As 
such, Muhammadiyah members involved in the activities of  the National 
Movement to Guard the Fatwa of  Ulama (Gerakan Nasional Pengawal 
Fatwa, GNPF) and Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) 
were officially acting as individuals—even when they claimed to represent 
Muhammadiyah. This was, of  course, detrimental to the organization. 
24 Abdul Mukti, interview (18 Mar 2019).
25 See Fx Ismanto, “Forum Ulama BPI KPNPA RI Gelar Istighosah Di Jambi 
Berikan Rasa Aman & Damai”, Tribunnews.com (24 Mar 2018), https://www.tribunnews.
com/nasional/2018/03/24/forum-ulama-bpi-kpnpa-ri-gelar-istighosah-di-jambi-
berikan-rasa-aman-damai, accessed 17 May 2019.
26 “Dalam Sejarah, Jokowi Presiden Terbanyak Silaturrahmi Ke Muhammadiyah”, 
Getar.id (6 Apr 2019), http://getar.id/2019/04/06/dalam-sejarah-jokowi-presiden-
terbanyak-silaturrahmi-ke-muhammadiyah/, accessed 18 May 2019.
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Muhammadiyah is aware of  the difficulty. When Muslims want to 
carry out practical political work, engaging in supportive action means 
supporting a presidential candidate. Muhammadiyah, however, stands 
by its choice to focus on national politics. Such politics are very noble, 
though not without risk. We know that Muhammadiyah will be a topic 
of  conversation, but we are sure to not get involved in practical politics. 
Muhammadiyah invites its members to get involved in practical politics, 
but not on behalf  of  Muhammadiyah.27
According to the General Secretary’s statement, Muhammadiyah 
did not officially support the Aksi Damai (Peace Action) held on March 
30, 2019, in Jakarta or similar protests. However, Muhammadiyah activists 
from various parts of  Indonesia were present and involved. Some 
members regretted the organization’s neutrality; for example, Dahnil 
Anzar Simanjuntak—the former chairman of  the Muhammadiyah Youth 
Organization (Organisasi Pemuda Muhammadiyah)—took part in the Aksi 
Damai as the spokesperson for Presidential Candidate Prabowo Subianto. 
Likewise, some Muhammadiyah leaders from Jakarta, West Java, and Bali 
participated in the peaceful protests before the 2019 Presidential Election.
Recognizing members support for candidates, the Muhammadiyah 
Central Chairperson stated that the organization felt that the need to 
avoid using Muhammadiyah attributes was significant. Similarly, the 
General Secretary of  Muhammadiyah highlighted the importance of  
maintaining neutrality:
We are part of  Muhammadiyah, from the central to the branch level. 
If  you feel uneasy with Muhammadiyah and disagree with the Islamic 
ideology promoted by Muhammadiyah, please choose another group. 
If  you are interested in HTI, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI/
Indonesian Mujahedeen Council), PKS, Salafi, or something similar, 
please leave Muhammadiyah. Let us take care of  leaders and followers 
who agree with Muhammadiyah’s organizational lines. Muhammadiyah 
never ‘fires’ its followers. But it does not mean bringing other ideologies 
into Muhammadiyah will be acceptable. Such behavior is a violation of  
organizational ethics.28 
The statement above implies that there is a “struggle for Islamic 
27 Abdul Mukti, interview (18 Mar 2019).
28 Ibid.
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ideology” within Muhammadiyah, specifically between its ideology of  
moderate (wasatiyyah) Islam and political Islamic ideologies that tends 
to belittle the government. As a result, Muhammadiyah members were 
divided between practical political movement and cultural activities. 
Ustaz (scholars of  Islam) who attend and even promote political 
protests, including Abdul Somad, Bahtiar Nasir, Yusuf  Mansur, Adi 
Hidayat, Hanan Ataqi, are popular among Muhammadiyah members, 
even more so than ustaz such as Yunahar Ilyas, Hamim Ilyas, Faturrahman 
Kamal, and Gunawan. This can be seen in members involvement in 
Muhammadiyah activities. This was confirmed by members in West 
Java, who stated:
One day, the West Java PWM invited the Central Chairperson of  
Muhammadiyah to speak at its Mujahidin Mosque. We had expected 
some 2000 people, but only around 200 people registered. Finally, the 
committee asked the Muhammadiyah hospitals, middle schools, and high 
schools in Bandung to attend the recitation because we were ashamed. 
The Chairperson was received by so few people. Meanwhile, when Bahtiar 
Nasir and Amien Rais came, 5,000 Muhammadiyah members attended, 
some even coming from outside Bandung.29 
D. Division of  Political Power
Muhammadiyah’s leadership has become a standard for determining 
the division of  power. Under the Joko Widodo government, there must 
be alternative means of  accommodating the thoughts and political 
aspirations of  the ummah. 
Looking at the roles of  Muhammadiyah, there are two applicable 
and profitable strategies. The first involves political activities oriented 
towards a “low” politics (real politics, practical politics) struggle for 
power, as done by political parties and formal political forces at the 
national level. The second involves community activities as well as 
indirect political activities (“high” politics) that offer the moral authority 
to improve people’s lives.30
29 Muhammadiyah Regional Leadership, PDMP, and Nasyiatul Aisyiyah, Focus 
Group Discussion (West Java, February 24, 2019).
30 Haedar Nashir, Muhammadiyah Gerakan Pembaruan (Yogyakarta: Suara 
Muhammadiyah, 2010), pp. 2–5.
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Muhammadiyah does many social events for its members, holding 
that the social aspect of  community empowerment is no less critical and 
strategic than the political aspect of  power. The creation of  community 
leaders and strong civil society is a main pillar of  Muhammadiyah’s 
organizational struggle; meanwhile, power struggles are intended to 
form governments and formally and directly done by political parties and 
state political institutions through the prevailing political system. These 
are interconnected within a healthy political system by national forces 
working towards the realization of  the country’s goals.31
In the context of  nationalism and the ummah, Muhammadiyah’s 
leadership must respond to all of  the nation’s problems, either at the 
level of  “low” politics or “high” politics. Muhammadiyah is expected to 
create figures who possess integrity and professionalism, through which 
it could unite Muslims at both the central and regional levels. As such, 
even with its organizational neutrality, Muhammadiyah has a strategic 
and vital role in national politics.
In present-day Indonesia, many outside Muhammadiyah have 
appeared and tried to attract the sympathy of  the masses. This has 
hindered Muhammadiyah’s activities. Before the general election, mass 
organizations such as FPI and GNPF MUI dominated the news cycle with 
their protests. Interviews with regional leaders in West Java suggested that 
Muhammadiyah was still unable to respond to Muslims’ needs and the 
real condition of  public politics in Indonesia. Muhammadiyah’s political 
position is seen as problematic, being neither prohibitive or supportive:
Muhammadiyah’s current leadership needs character management in its 
development of  cadres. Such figures will strengthen the Islamic Ghiroh 
for Muslims. From there, Muhammadiyah can emerge as a leader, not 
FPI. If  FPI were the leader, responsibilities would not be unclear. Unlike 
the Fajr Congregation Movement and Sharia Cooperative of  212 driven 
by the GNPF MUI, Muhammadiyah can draw positive energy from the 
Islamic ummah and propagate its struggle while responding to current 
national conditions.32 
Furthermore, in a meeting with the Muhammadiyah Regional 
31 Sidang Tanwir Muhammadiyah, Khittah Muhammadiyah dalam Kehidupan 
Berbangsa dan Bernegara (PP Muhammadiyah, 2002).
32 Muhammad Ikhsan, interview (18 Mar 2019).
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Leadership in West Java, members expressed their view that 
Muhammadiyah should take a political stance, seeing the 2019 
General Election as a moment for Muhammadiyah to reformulate its 
approach to politics. Other mass organizations had taken advantage of  
Muhammadiyah’s slow response to the alleged blasphemy to seize the 
political stage and lead Indonesia’s Muslims. Muhammadiyah certainly 
did not expect Rizieq Shihab to become the leader of  Indonesia’s ummah, 
let alone a “high priest”. 
Based on the above analysis, Muhammadiyah elites’ attitudes 
towards the organization’s central leadership can be seen in their 
recommendations. See, for example, the below quote: 
First, Muhammadiyah needs to place cadres appropriately and choose 
cadres with organizational competency. Second, it is necessary to 
reformulate Muhammadiyah’s attitudes towards politics, economics, 
law, religion, and education. Third, “allocative politics” – the division of  
power. There needs to be a change in Muhammadiyah’s attitude towards 
politics (from neutrality to allocative and advocative/responsive politics) 
both at the level of  low politics and high politics. Muhammadiyah must 
take part in ‘allocative politics’ within the executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches.33 
It seems that Muhammadiyah elites want the organization to act 
in both high and low politics. However, support for high politics is 
stronger than that for low politics, and as such some Muhammadiyah 
members felt unrepresented in the organization’s neutrality in the 2019 
General Election. 
Muhammadiyah is better at national politics, which nurtures all citizens 
and helps the weak, rather than being political ‘lipstick’ that looks red 
but has no taste. Muhammadiyah must therefore work towards playing 
‘salty’ politics. If  so, it would not be invisible.34
Discussion with Muhammadiyah’s regional leaders in West 
Java and Bali showed that members have different perceptions at the 
regional level. For example, in the above-mentioned provinces, members 
rejected the organizational neutrality asserted in Press Statement of  the 
Muhammadiyah Central Leadership Number: 552/PER/I.0/A/2016 
33 Zulkarnaen, interview (18 Mar 2019).
34 Ahmad Syafii Maarif, interview (20 Mar 2019).
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(dated November 4, 2016) regarding Peaceful Demonstrations and its 
statement regarding the 2019 General Election. Followers asked two 
fundamental questions: What is Muhammadiyah’s political formula? What 
is Muhammadiyah’s position regarding Indonesia’s political situation?
Muhammadiyah is considered less strict in its political attitudes, 
a perception that is motivated by its responses to Indonesia’s current 
political conditions. Problems have included, as stated by M. Busro 
Muqodas:
• The Indonesian government’s cooperation with China, as shown by 
several Chinese investments and news about Chinese foreign workers.
• The relationship between the government and Shia, including Iran
• Indonesia’s lack of  concern for the bombing of  Aleppo and the 
Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar
• Issues with minority and arrogance power, with senior politicians 
being perceived as arrogant and as spreading rumor in the mass 
media and on social media.
• Conflict within the ummah, including between Muhammadiyah/NU 
and MUI/ FPI.
• Disappointment with uncontrolled price increases, tax increases, and 
electricity bills.
This study also finds that Muhammadiyah elites hope the 
organization can improve its leadership and urge the government to 
take a firmer stance. Some think that Muhammadiyah needs to adjust its 
political stance, to incorporate resistance and seize existing opportunities. 
Muhammadiyah’s Institute of  Hikmah and Public Policy (Lembaga 
Hikmah dan Kebijakan Publik) has an essential role in uniting followers 
behind existing political attitudes, and as such cannot remain silent on 
political matters.
The following quote illustrates how Muhammadiyah’s political 
stance as an organization sometimes differs significantly from those of  
its members. Members seem to expect the organization’s leaders to be 
assertive, while leaders have held that Muhammadiyah may not become 
involved in practical politics. As stated by the General Secretary of  
Muhammadiyah’s Central Leadership:
All this time, the Muhammadiyah Central Leadership has repeatedly 
stated that Muhammadiyah does not practice (party) politics, but does 
14 Al-Jāmi‘ah, Vol. 57, No. 1, 2019 M/1440 H
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politics nationally.35 
This has happened since the leadership of  Ahmad Syafii Maarif  in 
2000–2005, which coincided with the 2004 Presidential Election. At 
the time, Amien Rais, the former Chairman of  Muhammadiyah, ran for 
president. The central leadership did not officially support Amien Rais. 
Rather, Muhammadiyah prioritized national politics and humanity.36
Such firmness is key to Muhammadiyah’s political stance. Even 
though it may not practice politics, Muhammadiyah is able to critique 
the government37 without being dragged into practical politics (even 
as members are involved in such “low” politics). Previous efforts to 
get Muhammadiyah institutionally involved in practical politics were 
unsuccessful (as reflected in its official political stance).38
Differences in the political perceptions of  Muhammadiyah 
members and leaders have resulted in a “tug-of-war” during Indonesia’s 
four presidential elections since the fall of  the New Order regime (i.e. 
in 2004, 2009, 2014 and 2019). Muhammadiyah seems to have asserted 
political resistance, thereby affecting the organization’s political direction. 
The Chairman of  Muhammadiyah, Busyro Muqqodas, stated that 
Muhammadiyah will remain critical of  the government, especially in 
politics. 
Muhammadiyah, as a massive Islamic organization, has never been afraid 
of  the state government. It is not rebelling, because Muhammadiyah 
believes that criticism and cooperation with the State/Government are 
both necessary for national progress.39
E. Positioning of  the Ummah Leadership
As a major Islamic organization, Muhammadiyah certainly hopes to 
play a major role in national development and progress. Muhammadiyah 
35 Abdul Mukti, interview (18 Mar 2019).
36 Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Islam dalam Bingkai Keindonesiaan dan Kemanusiaan: Sebuah 
Refleksi Sejarah (Bandung: Mizan & Maarif  Institute, 2009), pp. 177–80.
37 Haedar Nashir, Ideologi Gerakan Muhammadiyah (Yogyakarta: Suara 
Muhammadiyah, 2001), pp. 35–6.
38 Nashir, Muhammadiyah Gerakan Pembaruan, pp. 225–7.
39 M. Busyro Muqoddas, interview (20 Mar 2019).
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shapes society through its socio-religious and educational activities, 
including the creation of  hospitals and orphanages. However, Muslims—
even members—are still questioning Muhammadiyah’s representation 
of  Muslims. Muslims often see Muhammadiyah as not present on the 
political stage, and as slow to respond to the emerging problems of  
Muslims. It is possible that Muhammadiyah members and other Muslims 
do not understand Muhammadiyah’s political activities or observe said 
activities directly. Muslims and Muhammadiyah members seem to hope 
that, rather than high politics, Muhammadiyah should actively practice 
low politics.
If  Muhammadiyah fails to actively respond to the problems of  the 
Indonesian people, members will be unable to understand its political 
struggles. Muhammadiyah needs to provide an example to Indonesia’s 
significant Muslim population—who comprise 87,2 % of  Indonesia’s 
254 million residents.40 To do so, it must also strengthen its bonds 
with other Islamic organizations that share Muhammadiyah’s vision. 
Some Muhammadiyah members argue that, in the current situation, 
Muhammadiyah needs to mainstream its leadership activities. It should 
“go with the flow”, have an explicit political stance, and be independent 
of  other organizations; in other words, it should choose a practical 
political path.
The public has lost its interest in political parties because of  
their identification with corruption and money politics. As such, 
Muhammadiyah needs to work together with NU to strengthen its 
political attitudes. It must have cadres—not leaders—who can maneuver 
themselves politically while still showing integrity.
We have found arguments that Muhammadiyah’s political stance 
must be firm. When it does not become involved in politics, other 
organizations will take advantage. As such, Muhammadiyah must urge 
its cadres to step forward and thereby abandon its stance of  neutrality. 
Politics is full of  risks; however, Muhammadiyah must be involved in 
less risky politics. 
Din Syamsuddin’s statement below shows the firmness of  
Muhammadiyah’s political stance within the context of  Muslims’ political 
40 “Agama”, Indonesia.go.id, https://www.indonesia.go.id/profil/agama, accessed 
17 May 2019. 
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revival: 
Muhammadiyah may not be neutral in Indonesian politics. Muhammadiyah 
must make a stance. We members of  Muhammadiyah have long been 
a part of  Indonesian politics, even if  we don’t form political parties. 
Politics does not have to mean political parties, or at least contributions 
to political parties. We must not be silent in politics. Politics is not neutral. 
We must take a side.41
Syamsuddin’s statement above implies that Muhammadiyah should 
not only simply wait for the government. Even though it is not a political 
party, Muhammadiyah must be active in national and party politics. 
Indeed, Muhammadiyah has long been involved in national politics, and as 
such it cannot be identified as apolitical. Syamsuddin, a former politician 
with the Golongan Karya Party, seems to have taken a different political 
stance than the Muhammadiyah Central Leadership, who have avoided 
bringing Muhammadiyah into practical politics.
The issue of  national and regional leadership must also be 
formulated based on fikih siyasah, as adapted to local conditions. For 
example, in Denpasar, Bali, Muhammadiyah could not make its choice 
based on religious identity, as most locals are Hindu. This does not mean 
that Muhammadiyah avoided becoming involved in politics. Politics 
means risk, and thus Muhammadiyah must take risks.
Political developments in Indonesia since 1999 showed that 
Muhammadiyah members had used the National Mandate Party (Partai 
Amanat Nasional, PAN) as a vehicle for their political activities. Although 
members had the freedom to support other political parties, until 
2014 Muhammadiyah members only gained executive power through 
PAN. Muhammadiyah members thus used PAN as a vehicle for their 
aspirations.42 
Muhammadiyah members, especially those involved in PAN, thus 
required clarity about the organization’s political stance. This is especially 
true in the lead-up to general and regional elections throughout Indonesia, 
when Muhammadiyah members had difficulty entering parliament as 
41 Din Syamsuddin, interview (17 Mar 2019).
42 Rosyida Prihandini, ‘Relasi Partai Amanat Nasional dengan Muhammadiyah 
di dalam Struktur DPD PAN Surabaya Periode 2010-2015’, Jurnal Politik Muda, vol. 3, 
no. 3 (2014), pp. 357–68.
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their political activities were not formally supported. Muhammadiyah’s 
neutrality meant that it remained distant from political parties and 
forbade its leaders and administrators from becoming involved in 
practical political positions; such a stance could not readily be accepted 
by politicians involved in the organization.
Members hoped that the Muhammadiyah would not prohibit them 
from becoming involved in practical politics. This was particularly difficult 
for the organization’s leaders, who were required to remain neutral and 
thus avoided politics. It was hoped that, by allowing members to become 
active in practical politics, the organization could communicate politically 
with members in parliament (if  elected).
Did this mean that Muhammadiyah must allow its members, and 
even its leaders, to become politicians? If  so, would this cause difficulties 
for Muhammadiyah at the regional level? Of  course, this issue received 
serious attention from Muhammadiyah’s leaders at the national and 
regional levels.
Muhammadiyah’s Chief  Secretary in West Java, who expressed 
hope that the organization would be involved in practical politics, stated: 
It is better for Muhammadiyah’s Central Leaders to free leaders at the 
regional (provincial/regency) level to do politics. This would benefit 
Muhammadiyah. If  Muhammadiyah’s Central Leaders prohibit their 
cadres from practicing politics, it would be challenging to get them into 
political parties.43
However, these desires have not received the official support of  
Muhammadiyah’s Central Leadership. The organization has avoided 
formally approving members’ political involvement. Muhammadiyah 
has remained distant from political parties, but it has not prohibited 
cadres from practicing politics. Muhammadiyah’s Central Leadership only 
prohibits its leaders at the regional leaders from becoming party leaders.
Muhammadiyah’s attempt to keep a distance from all political 
parties, and to avoid explicitly providing political support to candidates, 
suggests that it fears risks. Conversely, this political neutrality could 
adversely affect the political attitudes of  successful candidates and inform 
their selection of  cabinet members. 
The idea of  Muhammadiyah’s charitable political efforts (amal 
43 M. Rizal Fadillah, interview (18 Mar 2019).
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usaha politik) needs serious attention from the organization’s leadership. 
Syamsuddin’s idea of  Muhammadiyah members and activists becoming 
involved in practical politics, such as by joining political parties or 
becoming members of  parliament, is positive; this is not the freedom 
to become a PAN politician, but rather to join any party. Such allocative 
politics were suggested by Din Syamsuddin ten years ago, even before 
he became the Chairman of  Muhammadiyah’s Central Leadership. 
In this regard, Muhammadiyah politicians recommend that 
the organization do the following: (1) improve political education; 
(2) encourage young people to become active in General Elections 
Commission, political parties, etc.; (3) practice allocative politics; (4) be 
active in legal, political, economic, religious, and educational activities. 
The Muhammadiyah Youth Leader of  West Java stated that: 
We can’t just be quiet. We must encourage potential Muhammadiyah 
members to become politicians, not prohibit it, and the struggle must be 
real. Politics cannot always be good and fair to everyone. If  Muhammadiyah 
continues to be that way, politicians will leave Muhammadiyah.44
F. The Resurrection of  Islamic Politics?
The 2019 General Election left many questions unanswered for 
Muslims and for Muhammadiyah. Is it true that there has been a political 
revival of  Muslims? Is it true that Muslims’ political pendulum has swung 
from the high politics of  Muhammadiyah to the low or “real” politics of  
Islamic organizations such as FPI, MUI, and GNPF? Muhammadiyah 
has also faced serious questions as a large Islamic organization that has 
a progressive mission of  wasathiyah (moderation).45
In the 1980s, the New Order government under President Soeharto 
had implemented a single principle policy, whereby political parties and 
religious organizations had to recognize Pancasila as their sole founding 
principle. Any socio-political or faith-based organizations that failed to 
recognize Pancasila were closed or labelled subversive, being branded as 
rejecting the state’s single national principle. Muhammadiyah and NU also 
took Pancasila as their organizational principle, even though they retained 
44 Iu Rusliana, interview (18 Mar 2019).
45 Amirrahman, Nubowo, and Khoirudin (eds.), Islam Berkemajuan untuk 
Peradaban Dunia: Refleksi dan Agenda Muhammadiyah ke Depan.
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Islam as their theological foundation. KH AR. Fachruddin, a cultural 
leader from Muhammadiyah, identified Muhammadiyah’s acceptance 
of  Pancasila as a sort of  “helmet diplomacy”. As the helmet protects 
the rider’s head, so too did Muhammadiyah’s acceptance of  Pancasila as 
its sole organizational principle prevented the organization from being 
branded an enemy of  the authoritarian and repressive state.46
As a cultural movement, Muhammadiyah has operated schools, 
hospitals, orphanages, and various economic institutions. It has also 
constructed hundreds of  mosques and educated thousands of  Islamic 
scholars. This has been part of  what Hefner describes as the booming 
of  new santri among middle-class Muslims. Between 1979 and 1990, 
the number of  State Islamic Institute (IAIN) students across Indonesia 
increased fourfold, from 28,000 to 100,000. In 1991, some 14% of  high 
school graduates attended one of  Indonesia’s 14 IAINs. Likewise, the 
number of  mosques increased drastically, from 15,374 in 1973 to 17,750 
in 1979, 20,648 in 1984, and 25,655 in 1990; of  these, Muhammadiyah 
owned 6,118. Meanwhile, NU was operating more than 30,000 Islamic 
boarding schools by 2014; every year, 100 new boarding schools open 
in Indonesia.47
Such cultural developments have not, however, been as prominent 
in politics. Muslims in Indonesia have suffered politically for much of  the 
country’s history. In the 1955 elections, Islamic politicians—represented 
by the Masjumi and NU parties—received a significant percentage of  
votes. As such, Muslims enjoyed extensive political space. However, 
following the rise of  the New Order in the 1960s, Muslims’ did not 
enjoy such political space. Indeed, some observers said that Muslims 
experienced marginalization in the public sphere.48 
Only in the 1990s, following the establishment of  various facilities 
for Muslims, did Muslims begin to enjoy access to vast political space 
under Soeharto. Muslims were facilitated with the establishment of  the 
46 Imron Nasri (ed.), Meremajakan Pimpinan Muhammadiyah (Yogyakarta: Suara 
Muhammadiyah, 2010), pp. 12–3.
47 Zamakhsyari Dhofier, Tradisi Pesantren: Studi tentang Pandangan Hidup Kyai 
(Jakarta: Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan, dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial, 1982), 
p. 26.
48 Muhammad Rusli Karim, Negara dan Peminggiran Islam Politik (Yogyakarta: 
Tiara Wacana Yogya, 1999), pp. 217–9.
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Muamalat Bank (1989), the acceptance of  hijab in public schools and 
government offices, and the recitation of  the Qur’an at government 
offices. The Indonesian Association of  Muslim Intellectuals was formed 
in December 1990, and Suharto’s family went on the hajj pilgrimage to 
Mecca that same year. Bahtiar Effendi described this phenomenon as an 
accommodative political success for Muslims, who were no longer trapped 
in a confrontational and violent relationship with the government. The 
government changed its political attitude, giving Muslims more space 
for political activities that accommodated and supported its policies.49
In the early 1990s, people were familiar with the term ‘political 
flow’ (aliran politik). Many political parties and groups were created, 
supporting extent parties such as PPP (established in the 1970s). Is 
it true that the national political pendulum has swung from non-flow 
politics to second-volume flow politics? Furthermore, is it true that there 
has been a shift in Muslims’ political orientation from Muhammadiyah 
and NU to non-mainstream groups such as FPI and HTI? If  so, what 
exactly must be done by Muhammadiyah as it carries the banner of  Islam 
rahmatan lil alamin?
Since the 1990s, there has been a significant shift in the political 
regime’s attitude towards Muslims. While the state did implement a single 
principle policy in 1984, this was accepted by Indonesian Muslims at 
Muhammadiyah and NU. Now, Muslims have the opportunity to join 
the bureaucracy, army, police, and finance sector. No longer are they like 
‘ringwormed cats’—to borrow a term from Mohammad Natsir, one of  
Indonesia’s prime ministers under President Soekarno and the former 
chairman of  Masjumi.50
In the 2019 General Election, as new and mature Islamic groups 
intersected, there appeared to be a resurgence of  political Islam that 
resulted in sectarianism. Does this represent a substantial change in 
Islamic politics? Does it signal the rise of  political Islam? Is it true that 
this type of  political Islam is shifting from values of  diversity, equality, 
and Islamic modernism to something more radical, fundamentalist, or 
49 Agus Riyanto, “Islam dan Negara: Metamorfosa Pemikiran Politik Islam 
Indonesia”, Spektrum, vol. 1, no. 1 (2004), pp. 178–199.
50 Afan Gaffar, Politik Indonesia: Transisi menuju Demokrasi (Yogyakarta: Pustaka 
Pelajar, 1999).
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artificial? Or, is the reverse happening?51
G. Concluding Remarks
The findings of  this article suggest that Muhammadiyah will remain 
an essential part of  Indonesian politics as long as it can play its role 
strategically and responsively. Many hope that Muhammadiyah, rather 
than groups such as FPI, GNPF MUI, HTI, and MMI, will be a motor 
of  Muslim political and cultural activities. The organization remains 
seen as a cornerstone of  moderate and progressive Islam, as a means of  
spreading a specific message rather than as a political party.
In the 2019 General Election, Muhammadiyah did not officially 
support any presidential candidate or specific political party. It chose this 
“middle way” even as some Muhammadiyah activists actively campaigned 
for certain candidates or even ran for office themselves in the government. 
Muhammadiyah has remained a non-partisan organization, an influential 
force in society. Muhammadiyah only needs to redefine its role in politics 
and be responsive to the nation’s problems.
Many political actors need a means of  channeling their political 
aspirations, and members of  Muhammadiyah have found themselves 
divided. A small minority wish that Muhammadiyah had become directly 
involved in the 2019 elections; a majority of  members, however, do 
not desire this. Opponents to active political participation argue that 
Muhammadiyah should remain a cultural entity, and that can use cultural 
means to promote national integrity.
Indonesia’s Muslims need political clarity, particularly given that 
some believe that Joko Widodo’s leadership is weak and unauthoritative. 
As an Islamic organization, Muhammadiyah should remain active, 
offering a counterweight to the political power, networks, and activities 
of  other countries.
51 Edward Aspinall and Ward Berenschot, Democracy for Sale: Elections, Clientelism, 
and the State in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019).
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